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Germany:  





Germany is a low-fertility country with a rapidly ageing population, and will remain so 
for the foreseeable future. There are several reasons for this trend. Germany is among 
the countries with the highest rates of childlessness in the world, and childlessness has 
become widely accepted. This is illustrated by changes in living arrangements. A broad 
range  of  living  arrangements  has  been  added  to  the  basic  model  of  marriage  with 
children; namely, single living, non-marital cohabitation, lone parenthood, patchwork 
families and living apart together. A culture of individualism has spread in Germany 
which forms the basis for widespread decisions against family formation. The desired 
number of children has become low and family policy is considered to be a failure in 
terms of its influence on fertility. German family policy has had a traditional orientation 
centred on monetary support to families and on the promotion of the male breadwinner 
model. Women have been largely forced to choose between family and work, and leave 
the labour market when a child is born. The still prevailing concept of family policy 
does not help to reduce the pressure to choose between work and family life, and thus 
makes it easier to decide not to have children, especially for highly educated women. A 
change in family policy is needed which will enable couples to choose between the 
breadwinner-housewife and the reconciliation model. Gradually, this change is starting 
to take place.  
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1. Introduction: The demographic situation in Germany  
Germany  is  the  second  most  populous  European  country  (after  Russia),  with  a 
population of 82.32 million on 1 January 2007. It is also among the 20 countries with 
the  lowest  Total  Fertility  Rates  worldwide  (Population  Reference  Bureau  2007), 
something which has been typical of at least Western Germany since the mid-1970s. An 
intensive debate has developed recently on this topic. It was instigated by the ageing of 
the population, and by the risk this poses to the social security systems. It is, above all, 
the childless  who have become the subject of observation, and  who are accused of 
investing in private old-age pensions since they do not have to pay for children, whilst 
parents are investing in tomorrow’s contributors. “No children – no pension, one child – 
half pension” is only one of the catch-phrases used in this discussion. One of the main 
aims of this chapter is to analyse and explain the low-fertility situation which has arisen 
in Germany. Before analysing fertility and family changes in the country, I first provide 
an outline of demographic trends in Germany. 
The population of Germany reached a maximum of 82.54 million in 2003, and 
started to diminish thereafter as a result of declining immigration and persistent low 
fertility rates. During the year 2006, the population declined by 123,000, i.e., by 0.1%, 
which was the largest absolute and relative decline since 1984 (Council of Europe 2006, 
Eurostat 2008). The population of Germany has a rather unique position in Europe; it 
has  recorded  a  negative  rate  of  natural  increase  for  more  than  three  decades.  The 
number of deaths has exceeded the number of births every year since 1972. This ‘birth 
deficit,’ which reached 149,000 in 2006, had been more than counterbalanced by high 
immigration rates in the period 1986-2002, partly driven by a high rate of immigration 
of ethnic Germans (so-called Aussiedler or Spätaussiedler), especially from the former 
Soviet Union, Poland, and Romania. As this migration stream started to evaporate in 
the  early  2000s,  the  overall  migration  balance  became  much  less  significant  for 
population change, and, between 2001 and 2006, the net migration increase fell from a 
high of 274,800 to a mere 23,000 (preliminary data released by the Federal Statistical 
Office). Since 1989, population decline and a negative migration balance have been 
most pronounced in the Eastern part of Germany (former GDR, frequently referred to as 
Neue Länder), which lost 108,000 persons (0.8% of the total population) in 2006, and, 
overall,  some  two  million  persons  (12%  of  the  initial  population)  since  1988  (this 
statistic also includes the territory of the former West Berlin). 
The  shift  towards  an  older  age  structure  and  fewer  married  people  constitutes 
another long-term development.  Hence, the number of people over age 65 increased 
from 13.69 million to 15.87 million between 2000 and 2005, i.e., by 16%. The average 
age increased from 39 to 42 years between 1990 and 2005 (Federal Statistical Office 
2007).  With  a  population  median  age  of  42.1,  Germany  had  the  second  oldest Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 17 
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population in the world after Japan in 2005, which recorded a median age of 42.9 years 
(United Nations 2006, Table A.11). Because of the low  marriage rate and the high 
divorce  rate,  the  number  of  married  couples  continues  to  decline,  and  the  share  of 
people who are married exceeds the share of those who have never married only at 
relatively advanced childbearing ages; i.e., among men over age 35 and women over 
age 30 (Statistisches Jahrbuch 2007). 
There were 7.29 million foreigners living in Germany in 2006, representing 8.8% 
of the population. The number, as well as the share, of foreigners in the total population 
rose in the 1980s (from 5.6% in 1986) and the early 1990s, but have stabilised since the 
late 1990s (Eurostat 2008). The number of foreigners has remained relatively stable 
owing to naturalisations, with the number of naturalisations coming close to the number 
of new foreign-nationality migrants. In 2006, 124,830 non-German nationals living in 
Germany received German citizenship (Federal Statistical Office 2007). Overall, 15.3 
million  inhabitants  of  Germany—18.6%  of  the  total—were  estimated  to  have  a 
migration background, i.e., were immigrants or descendants of immigrants, in 2005. Of 
those, 10.4 million people had immigrated since 1950 (Federal Statistical Office 2007). 
Children of foreign parents are able to acquire German nationality by birth if at least 
one parent has had his or her lawful place of habitual residence in Germany for at least 
eight years, and has a right of unlimited residence or has had a permanent residence 
permit for at least three years.  
In 2006, the number of marriages reached a trough of 373,681, the lowest number 
recorded in the period 1950-2006 (Eurostat 2008). In 1991, the total first marriage rate 
for women fell below 0.6 and, since 2001, it has hovered around 0.55, reaching 0.54 in 
2006.  According to the results of first marriage tables, roughly one-third of men and 
one-quarter of women still remain single when attaining age 50.  
After  reaching  a  post-war  peak  of  213,975  in  2003,  the  number  of  divorces 
subsequently fell by more than one tenth in 2004-2006, to 190,928 in 2006 (Eurostat 
2008). The total divorce rate showed an upward trend between the mid-1990s and 2003, 
when it reached 0.42; subsequently it declined below 0.4 in 2006. Seen by the duration 
of marriage, the largest number of marriages is dissolved in the sixth year of marriage. 
The  duration  of  marriage  until  divorce  is  increasing.  Divorce  took  place  after  an 
average of 13.1 years of marriage. About one half of divorced couples have at least one 
child below age 18; this number has been stable since the late 1990s (Federal Statistical 
Office 2007) 
The number of live births was falling annually between 1997 and 2006, when it 
reached 672,724, about a half of the numbers recorded during the baby boom era of the 
early 1960s.  The Total Fertility Rate (TFR) in Germany has remained low since the 
1970s; in 1975, Western Germany (the Federal Republic of Germany) became the first 
European country to experience a TFR below 1.5. This indicator has shown relatively Dorbritz: Germany: Family diversity with low actual and desired fertility 
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small changes since the second half of the 1990s, and reached 1.33 in 2006 (Federal 
Statistical Office 2007). In the 1990s, the territory of the former GDR had a markedly 
lower  total  fertility  rate  than  the  Western  parts  of  Germany,  but  this  gap  has  been 
closing since the second half of the 1990s, and had almost disappeared by 2006, when 
the TFR was 1.30 in Eastern Germany and 1.34 in Western Germany.  
Three children out of ten were born to unmarried women in 2006. The share of 
extramarital  children  has  doubled  since  the  start  of  the  1990s.  Here  too,  we  find 
noticeable differences between the two regions of Germany. In the former GDR, 60% 
of  all  children  are  born  to  unmarried  mothers,    compared  with  24%  in  Western 
Germany. The trend towards starting the family formation phase late has continued for 
more than three decades. In 2006 mothers were 29.6 years old on average when their 
child was born, up from 26.2 in the mid-1970s.  
As in other developed countries, life expectancy has increased continuously since 
the 1970s. According to the most recent mortality tables for 2004-2006, life expectancy 
of  newborn  girls  was  82.1  years,  and  was  76.6  years  for  newborn  boys.  The  gap 
between Western and Eastern Germany, which was most pronounced around 1990, has 
continued to close (Rostocker Zentrum 2005).  
The next sections of this article focus on fertility and family behaviour. Long-term 
changes  in  family  formation  in  both  parts  of  Germany  are  described  first,  and 
explanations are provided for the special patterns of family formation in Western and 
Eastern  Germany.  For  Eastern  Germany,  in  particular,  it  is  important  to  examine 
whether and how these patterns have changed as a result of the complete transformation 
which took place in the economic and social order with the collapse of the former GDR. 
The special situation in Western Germany becomes particularly evident in international 
comparisons.  A  “polarisation  situation”  has  arisen  as  a  result  of  the  high  level  of 
childlessness. The family-forming-age population can be roughly sub-divided into two 
groups: those who live with children, and are usually married; and those who have 
chosen not to have children, the vast majority of whom do not marry. The magnitude of 
the polarisation phenomenon is described using data from the Microcensus, which is a 
1%  sample.  Trends  towards  individualisation  in  society  and  the  concept  of  family 
policy in Germany are offered as explanatory factors for this situation. Family policy 
has a long tradition in Germany, but is nevertheless seen as a failure, and as one of the 
causes of childlessness. International comparative studies also show that, not only is 
fertility low, but that the desire to have children is also at a low level. It is the younger 
population, and, above all, the younger men, who wish to remain childless. This is 
illustrated using data from the German Population Policy Acceptance Study, taken in 
2003,  and  causes  are  to  be  sought  which  promote  such  individualistic  behavioural 
patterns.   Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 17 
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2. Long-term trends in family formation in Germany  
2.1 Period and cohort fertility  
As  in  many  other  European  countries,  the  long-term  fertility  trend  in  Germany  is 
typified by a pronounced increase after World War II (and, prior to that, during most of 
the 1930s), followed by a similarly steep decline in the late 1960s and during the 1970s. 
But  this  trend  also  entails  several  characteristics  which  are  typical  of  Germany, 
resulting from the special situation in the former GDR and from German reunification. 
In the course of the first demographic transition, which took place around 1900, the 
Total Fertility Rate (TFR) fell from almost five to roughly two (Fig. 1). The TFR was 
4.7 between  1871  and  1880,  whilst  in  1930  it  was  only  1.96. The TFR  values  are 
typified in the first years of the 20th century by considerable fluctuations caused by the 
crisis situations of the First and Second World Wars, as well as by the world economic 
crisis. The lows in period fertility these crises caused were followed by highs which 
were as short-lived as they were intense. For instance, the TFR reached a value of 1.95 
in 1917, and then increased to 3.38 in 1920. The lowest value is then reached in 1945, 
at 1.36.  
 













































Source: Federal Statistical Office, Germany; Federal Institute of Population Research. 
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In the period after the Second World War, the TFR increased once more. The 
development in both parts of Germany was almost identical between 1960 and 1965. 
The rise in fertility in East and West Germany is most likely a result of economic 
recovery, a climate of confidence in both regions of the country, and the fact that almost 
the entire generation was married. This period is referred to as the “Golden Age of 
Marriage”.  The  replacement  of  the  parents’  generations  was  exceeded  by  a  wide 
margin, with TFR values of 2.51 in the West and 2.48 in the East. Eventually, the TFR 
then began to fall again between the mid-1960s and the 1970s in both Western and 
Eastern Germany. The trends were identical, but the causes were completely different. 
Western  Germany  went  through  the  time  of  “Europe’s  Second  Demographic 
Transition”, about which van de Kaa (1987: 5) said: “Two keywords characterize the 
norms and attitudes behind the first and second demographic transitions and highlight 
the contrasts between them: altruistic and individualistic. The first transition to low 
fertility  was  dominated  by  concerns  for  family  and  offspring,  but  the  second 
emphasizes the rights and self-fulfilment of individuals”. Lesthaeghe and Neels (2002) 
link the fall in fertility to the emphasis placed on individual autonomy in ethical, moral 
and political terms; with the rejection of all forms of institutional control and authority 
and the increasing spread of expressive values, connected to the so-called higher-order 
needs of self-realisation. Such a development was out of the question in a state socialist 
regime  such  as  the  former  GDR.  Abortion  was  legalised  there  in  1971,  which 
accelerated the ongoing fall in the TFR (Fig. 1). In 1975, the TFR was 1.45 in Western 
Germany and 1.54 in Eastern Germany. Induced abortion became widely used as a 
method of family ‘planning’ and thus it played a role in accelerating fertility decline.    
Fertility  trends  in  the  two  regions  of  Germany  diverged  after  1975.  Fertility 
remained  at  its  constantly  low  level  in  Western  Germany.  The  patterns  of  family 
formation nonetheless continued to change in this period (cf. on this Section 3: The 
change in living arrangements and family forms). Fertility increased once more in the 
former GDR in the second half of the 1970s as a result of pronatalist population policy 
(cf. on this Section 2.2). This trend continued until 1976, after which the TFR gradually 
fell.  Nevertheless,  the  TFR  in  Western  and  Eastern  Germany  differed  considerably 
between the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s.  
With the fall of the Iron Curtain and the demise of the former GDR, the TFR 
started  to  fall  drastically  in  1990,  and  reached  a  historic  low  in  1994  with  a  Total 
Fertility Rate of 0.77. This situation was referred to as a “demographic shock” (e.g., 
Eberstadt 1994). It initially looked as if the population in the Eastern part of Germany 
had  reacted  to  the  complete  transformation  of  the  economic  and  social  system  by 
ceasing  to  marry,  have children and get divorced. The  frequent explanation  was as 
follows:  The  rapid  social  change  caused  by  accession  to  the  Federal  Republic  of 
Germany had led to a situation in which individuals attempted to keep constant all the Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 17 
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living  conditions  which  they  could  individually  influence  in  the  face  of  the  rapid 
changes that were going on in society. It was, however, revealed relatively rapidly that 
such an across-the-board hypothesis could not be maintained. The drop in divorce rates 
was the result of the new divorce law, and the separation year prior to divorce which it 
introduced. The concurrent rapid fall in the marriage rate could be explained by the fact 
that the central motive for marriage, namely, the birth of children, had ceased to apply. 
People  in  Eastern  Germany  reacted  strongly  to  the  end  of  the  GDR  with  a  fall  in 
fertility. This was caused by being unexpectedly released from the old circumstances 
and by the need to reorient oneself in a society about which not enough was known, and 
which therefore entailed insecurity about the future. 
The  German-German  differences  pertaining  from  the  mid-1970s  up  until  the 
demise of the former GDR can be explained with the following arguments (Philipov, 
Dorbritz 2003 153 ff.). First, the totalitarian regimes indirectly retained the tradition of 
family  formation  from  the  1960s.  Ideational  changes  which  supported  “Europe’s 
Second  Demographic  Transition”,  such  as  individual  autonomy  or  tolerance  of 
individualistic behavioural patterns, are virtually impossible in state socialist societies 
with  a  uniform  ideology,  strong  subjugation  of  the  individual  to  society  and 
considerable intolerance towards deviation. A change of values, as had taken place in 
Western Europe, was impossible under such circumstances.  
Second,  a  strongly  pronatalistic  population  policy  was  developed,  in  which 
instruments  such  as  child  allowances,  maternity  leave,  birth  assistance,  loans  or 
preferential housing provision were prominent. This sent out positive signals for family 
formation, to which people reacted. And even though there was no sustained increase in 
fertility, childlessness at least was kept low.  
Third, economic and social trends supported the peculiar patterns of early family 
formation which are typical of Central and Eastern Europe. This included increasing 
female employment as one of the main policy goals. The concomitant role conflicts for 
women were alleviated by the state through a widely-available, affordable childcare 
system. All in all, the social and economic conditions promoted early family formation 
with a limited number of children, but a low level of childlessness. 
Fourth, from a sociological point of view, the strong orientation towards the family 
in  Eastern  Germany  is  explained  by  the  limited  alternatives  competing  with  family 
formation as a biographical choice. With reduced choices, selection of the biographical 
option of “family formation” becomes more probable. This was also favoured in the 
state socialist societies by the fact that such biographical decisions were supported by a 
considerable  degree  of  social  security  (guaranteed  training,  full  employment,  cheap 
supply of basic goods). In light of the high degree of future security, people’s decisions 
for irreversible events such as the birth of children were made easier.  
 Dorbritz: Germany: Family diversity with low actual and desired fertility 
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Figure 2:  Age-specific birth rates of birth cohorts 1960 - 1981 in  
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The Eastern German birth cohorts reacted very differently to the change in these 
circumstances  since  1989.  In  order  to  illustrate  this,  the  age-specific  behavioural 
patterns of the 1960 to 1981 birth cohorts are plotted in the period 1975 to 1999. It is 
possible to distinguish three specific reaction patterns (Figure 2): 
Birth cohorts 1960 – 1966: These cohorts ceased childbearing almost completely 
after 1989 without  much recuperation later on. The  youngest of these birth cohorts 
(1966)  was  22  or  23  years  old  when  the  Berlin  Wall  fell  at  the  end  of  1989. The 
generally low age at birth in the former GDR had led to a situation in which a large 
number of the desired children had already been born. This is likely to have contributed 
to a situation in which family formation which had been initially interrupted in 1989 
was not taken up again later.  
Birth cohorts 1967 – 1972: Pronounced timing effects can be observed for these 
cohorts. Fertility began to rise sharply at very young ages just as in previous cohorts. In 
1990, though, they abruptly interrupted their birth biographies. Then, after 1994, these 
cohorts became the first to recuperate, at least in part, births at higher ages. The result is 
an age-specific birth curve with two peaks.  
Birth cohorts 1973 – 1981: An age pattern transformation can already be observed 
in the younger birth cohorts, which is also reflected in the increase in the average age of 
women at the birth of their children. The age-specific birth curves no longer show the 
rapid increase at very young ages found for older birth cohorts, but instead rise more 
gradually across women’s early twenties. 
The TFR in Eastern Germany started to rise once again from 1995 onwards, an 
increase which was relatively slow since only limited recuperation took place after the 
break in fertility in 1991. The East German TFR bounced back above 1.3 in 2004 and 
remained stable in 2005-2006. A Total Fertility Rate of 1.34 has been calculated for 
Western Germany in 2004. Thus, the TFR in both parts of Germany has converged. 
Looking beyond period fertility, however, it will be shown below that family formation 
patterns still differ considerably in some cases in the two regions of Germany. 
A similar approximation trend can also be observed in terms of completed cohort 
fertility (Fig. 3). Only data for Germany as a whole are available for birth cohorts 1865 
to 1930. These were the cohorts that primarily witnessed the first fall in completed 
cohort fertility. For instance, women born in 1865 had an average of 4.66 children. In 
birth cohort 1920, this figure was around 1.95. A distinction was made in this period 
between the expanded and simple replacement of the parents’ generations. An average 
of 3.44 children per woman were necessary in the birth cohort 1885 in order to achieve 
the replacement level, whereas 3.36 children were actually born. Since then, no birth 
cohort has achieved simple reproduction in Germany. An increase in the final number 
of children also took place once more for the cohorts born around 1935, who went Dorbritz: Germany: Family diversity with low actual and desired fertility 
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through their family formation phase in the “Golden Age of Marriage”, but even these 
cohorts did not achieve simple reproduction.  
 
Figure 3:  Completed fertility and replacement levels of the cohorts 1865 up to  
















































Source: Federal Statistical Office, Germany; Federal Institute of Population Research. 
 
 
Final numbers of children were almost the same in Western and Eastern Germany 
for cohorts born between 1930 and 1941. It was only with women born from 1942 
onwards that different developments took place. The continuous fall in the completed 
cohort fertility rates persisted in Western Germany. The 1967 birth cohort has, as of 
2004, reached an estimated total of 1.44 children. In Eastern Germany, fertility was 
higher, as reflected in period measures shown earlier. The downward trend had slowed 
in Eastern Germany from birth cohort 1942 onwards, and, in each case, roughly 1.8 
children were born to the birth cohorts 1951 to 1961. The birth cohort 1961 in Western 
Germany, by contrast, had an average of just 1.59 children. In Eastern Germany, it was 
only for cohorts born in the first half of the 1960s onwards that completed fertility 
began to fall. This constitutes the first impact of the “demographic shock” triggered by 
the demise of the GDR. There is virtually no difference between the cumulated fertility 
rates of the birth cohort 1967 in the West (1.44) and in the East (1.47).    Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 17 
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2.2 Excursus: Experience of the demographic impact of population policy – The 
example of the former GDR  
Since there is no pronatalist policy, Germany has virtually no experience of political 
influence on fertility. The only example available comes from the experience of the 
former GDR in the 1970s and 1980s. The background of the development is that the 
former GDR had set itself unambiguous population policy goals, although no clear birth 
rate targets had been formulated. The objective was to ensure the simple reproduction 
of the population in the long term. The two-to-three-child family was regarded as a 
social requirement at the family level.   
 
 
Figure 4:  Total Fertility Rate 1963 up to 1983 and age-specific fertility rates of  
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Source: Statistical Office of the former GDR. 
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The TFR started to fall faster in 1972, after abortion had been legalised (Figure 4). 
This was the reason why a whole series of population policy measures were enacted in 
1976, some of which were unambiguously pronatalist in nature. This set of measures 
included  an  expansion  of  maternity  leave  before  and  after  birth,  a  one-off  birth 
assistance payment, the introduction of a so-called “baby year”, the granting of interest-
free loans, release from work if children became ill, and special assistance for single 
mothers  and  mothers  attending  university.  The  marriage  loan  constitutes  a  good 
example  of  the  pronatalist  nature  of  population  measures  –  it  was  contingent  on 
marriage and could be paid off by the birth of children.    
Once these measures had been enacted, the Total Fertility Rate started to increase 
from 1.54 in 1975 to 1.94 in 1980. This trend led to a great deal of discussion on the 
birth-promoting impact of population policy measures (Büttner and Lutz 1990). The 
analysis of the period and cohort data shows that the impact was limited. The increase 
in the TFR from 1976 onwards was only made possible because, by legalising abortion, 
the TFR had previously fallen. What we see are primarily timing effects, which had led 
to the impression of an increase in fertility in the period view. In the cohort view, one 
can see that an increase in fertility is observed only for a small number of birth cohorts, 
namely those who were born in the first half of the 1950s. Typical of the situation 
which had occurred is the course of age-specific fertility in the cohort of 1952. At first 
age-specific fertility rates increased steeply, starting in 1967 and following the pattern 
that  was  typical  of  the  GDR.  The  increase  ceases  in  1972  with  the  possibility  of 
abortion, and a drop occurs. A renewed increase takes place in 1976 and 1977 – delayed 
births  are  caught  up  on.  The  age-specific  fertility  rates  of  the  subsequent  younger 
cohorts then no longer show the spread with two birth peaks, but once more the old 
pattern with a steep left-hand increase. The rise in the TFR hence took place by virtue 
of the fact that the process of catching up on births in the birth cohorts 1951 to 1954 
coincided  with  the  “normal”  age  pattern,  which  was  restored  in  the  ensuing  birth 
cohorts (Figure 4). If one examines the final number of children, these fluctuations can 
no longer be observed. The birth cohort 1952 reaches a similar final number of children 
as the birth cohort 1960. Completed fertility of all birth cohorts from 1950 to 1960 was 
essentially identical, namely 1.8 births per woman (Figure 3).  
According  to  this  analysis,  the  interplay  of  abortion  and  pronatalist  population 
policy above all created timing effects in the former GDR which initially created the 
impression  of  an  increase  in  (period)  fertility.  Nonetheless,  it  is  unlikely  that  these 
measures were entirely bereft of demographic impact. At least they made it possible for 
many  women  born  in  the  first  half  of  the  1950s  to  achieve  the  family  size  they 
originally wanted. Although these policies did not actually lead to an increase in cohort 
fertility,  they  might  have  prevented  its  further  decline,  as  it  occurred  in  Western 
Germany during the same time period. Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 17 
http://www.demographic-research.org  569 
2.3 Childlessness  
Childlessness is one of the demographic topics enjoying growing attention in Germany. 
Nevertheless, it must be initially stated that many questions regarding childlessness in 
Germany remain open. As Michaela Kreyenfeld and Dirk Konietzka have pointed out, 
"Childlessness is a theme which has recently aroused a lot of public attention, but the 
debate, which is led in the media and politics, is based on shaky grounds. The figures 
quoted to describe the extent of childlessness of men and women in our society diverge 
greatly and the assumed causes of the high childlessness in Germany are contradictory” 
(Kreyenfeld and Konietzka 2007: 11). The most serious problem is probably that the 
precise degree of childlessness is unknown. There are only estimates. The statistics of 
the natural population movement and of the Microcensus are available as data sources. 
Both data sets are, however, less than ideal. In the case of the statistics of the natural 
population movement, this is a result of the fact that the parity of live births is only 
recorded within present marriages. The parity spread of those children who are born to 
unmarried women must therefore be estimated. This is a problem in Eastern Germany 
in particular, since around 60% of children are born to unmarried women there. The 
number of children born is not surveyed in the Microcensus, but only the number of 
children living in the household. However, other questions, such as the relationship 
between wanted and unwanted childlessness, paths to childlessness, or childlessness 
among men and the highly-qualified, are also open. 
The  estimated  results  show  that  childlessness  in  Germany,  and  in  Western 
Germany in particular, is widespread and is rising rapidly. Only 7.1% of the Western 
German birth cohort 1935 remained childless (Fig. 5). This cohort underwent its family 
formation phase in the post-war period in the so-called “Golden Age of Marriage”, 
which was typified not only by high fertility, but also by low levels of childlessness. 
This period is, nevertheless, regarded as exceptional since today’s childlessness is not 
historically  new.  Twenty-six  percent  of  women  in  the  birth  cohorts  1901-05  were 
childless.  However,  this  degree  of  childlessness  came  about  under  special  social 
circumstances. The high degree of childlessness among women born around 1900 was a 
result of the First World War and of the number of men lost (Dorbritz and Schwarz, 
1996: 238). The same applies to women in the birth cohorts up to 1925 as a result of the 
Second World War. 
Childlessness started to rise continually and ever faster among women born after 
1935 in Western Germany. Twenty-one percent of the birth cohort 1960 is childless. 
Childlessness of 29% is already anticipated for the birth cohort 1966 (Dorbritz 2003). 
This  appears  to  be  a  rare  situation  in  Europe.  Only  in  Switzerland  does  one  find 
similarly high shares of childless women. In the context of the renewed increase in the 
share of childlessness, François Höpflinger (1991) speaks of the new childlessness, and Dorbritz: Germany: Family diversity with low actual and desired fertility 
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hence refers to the fact that this increase is not linked to social crisis situations, but 
results from a voluntary decision not to have children.  
 
 

























Source: Federal Institute for Population Research, own calculations. 
 
 
The  data  for  the  birth  cohorts  1940  to  1960  in  Eastern  Germany  show  that 
childlessness remained low there (Figure 5). The share of childless women in the birth 
cohort 1960 is 7.8%. Different behavioural patterns had hence become established in 
the two regions of Germany. The low rate of childlessness in the former GDR is a result 
of the conserving impact of the social circumstances in socialist societies, supporting 
the continuation of the behavioural patterns from the 1960s, as well as of the impact of 
the policy of reconciliation of work and parenthood. It was only in the birth cohorts 
after 1960 that childlessness also started to increase. A 13% share of childless women is 
anticipated for the 1966 birth cohort. This demonstrates the fact that different patterns 
of family formation still exist in both regions of Germany (cf. Section 4).  
What is noticeable and most intensively discussed in the German public debate is 
the very high level of childlessness among female university graduates. The available 
results are based on the data of the Microcensuses 1990–2003 (Duschek and Wirth Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 17 
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2005). Childlessness in the birth cohorts 1955 to roughly 1960 fluctuates around the 
already  high  value  of  approximately  30%.  Childlessness  then  increases  once  more 
among women with a higher-education qualification born after 1960, reaching a value 
of 35.3% in the birth cohort 1964, and 38.5% in 1965. This trend is explained by the 
choice women in Germany have to make between work and family, a decision which is 
prejudiced against children even more frequently among the highly-qualified who are 
oriented towards gainful employment. 
The high level of childlessness in Western Germany is the manifestation of the so-
called  polarisation  phenomenon.  The  population  is  accordingly  broken  down  into  a 
family sector (those who live with children) and a non-family sector (those who live 
without children). The increase in childlessness in Western Germany was linked to a 
fall in the share of women who had only one child. Many individuals make a decision 
not to have children, or, if they decide in favour of family formation, usually two or 
more children are born. The emergence of this situation is traced to the concept of 
German family policy and the concomitant unfavourable conditions for reconciliation 
of family and work (cf. Sections 6 and 7).   
 
 
2.4 Age patterns and extramarital births  
If  one  looks  at  the  distribution  of  live  births  by  the  age  of  the  mother  and  the 
development  of  the  shares  of  extramarital  live  births,  the  German  situation  can  be 
described in terms of both convergence and divergence.  
As  is  the  case  almost  everywhere  in  Europe,  the  mean  age  of  mothers  at 
childbearing has increased rapidly in Germany, from 26.2 in 1974 to 29.6 in 2006. 
Unmarried women have their children earlier, at the age of 27.9 on average (2004). 
Mean  age  at  first  birth  is  available  for  married  women  only,  who  constitute  an 
increasingly select group.  
 Dorbritz: Germany: Family diversity with low actual and desired fertility 
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Figure 6:  Age-specific fertility rates in Western and Eastern Germany, 1960,  



















































Source: Federal Statistical Office, Germany. 
 
 
In  turn,  different  trends  in  Western  and  Eastern  Germany  can  be  observed.  A 
continuous rising trend has taken place in Western Germany since the 1970s, whilst in 
Eastern Germany the pattern of early childbirth had been preserved. The spread of the 
age-specific birth rates shown in Figure 6 confirm the changes. The patterns of early 
childbirth became widespread in both parts of Germany in 1960. The age-specific peak 
value is found in Eastern Germany at the age of 23, and in Western Germany at the age 
of 25. A completely different situation had come about by 1990. The age distribution of 
births remained unchanged in Eastern Germany. The flatter curve only shows lower 
birth rates. A transformation in the age pattern had taken place in Western Germany, by 
contrast. The curve  for 1990 runs less steeply towards the left, and the peak value 
shifted to the age of 28. This process continued until 2004. The highest age-specific 
birth rates can  now be found at the age of 31. The pattern of early childbirth also 
dissolved with the end of the GDR. The distribution of live births over the age of the 
mothers hardly differs from that in Western Germany (birth peak occurred at age 30). In 
this  case,  therefore,  an  approximation  of  Eastern  German  to  the  Western  German 
behavioural patterns can be  observed. In 2004, the average age of Eastern  German Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 17 
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women at the birth of their children was 28.8 years old, while the average age among 
Western German women was 29.9 years old. The link between low fertility and high 
age at motherhood is referred to repeatedly. In the view of the author, this link is also a 
result of the partner situation. Roughly 20% of women in the age group of 30-39 years 
olds do not have a partner. Particularly in this group, the lack of a partner is a highly 
important argument against the birth of a(nother) child. If, therefore, family formation 
is commenced at a relatively high age, the biological time window is only open for a 
short time, and if no suitable partner is found, desired fertility is not achieved.  
 

























Source: Federal Statistical Office, Germany. 
* Since 2001: Western Germany not incl. West Berlin, Eastern Germany not incl. East Berlin. 
 
 
In contrast to the approximation of the age patterns, a divergent development has 
taken place in the shares of extramarital live births. Western Germany shows a pattern 
of a close link between marriage and childbirth. Twenty-four percent of children were 
born to unmarried mothers in Western Germany (not incl. West Berlin) in 2006. The 
share was 6.3% in 1960 and 10.5% in 1990. Thus, only in recent years has there been a 
somewhat faster increase in the share of extramarital births, which nevertheless has 
remained relatively low in the European comparison (Fig. 7). A completely different 
picture  is  offered,  by  contrast,  in  Eastern  Germany,  where  the  percentage  of Dorbritz: Germany: Family diversity with low actual and desired fertility 
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extramarital births already started to increase in the 1970s, which can be regarded as an 
effect of population policy in the former GDR. The share of extramarital live births 
already reached a value of almost 35% back in 1985. This does not mean that living 
together  with  children  and  being  married  were  decoupled  in  the  former  GDR.  The 
relatively high level can be explained by delaying effects on the age at marriage caused 
by family policy. Single mothers were particularly supported by family policy, received 
preferential treatment in housing and crèche places, and were able to claim paid release 
from work if the child was ill. In order to receive this support, people only married on 
expiration  of  the  claim  period  (when  the  child  turned  one).  This  did  not  have  an 
influence on the marriage rate, which was higher in the former GDR than in Western 
Germany. When these conditions ceased to apply, a drop in the extramarital rate was 
also anticipated in the 1990s. This presumption has, however, not been confirmed, and 
the upward trend continued. In recent years , roughly 60% of children were born to 
mothers who were not married at the time of birth. The differences in the German-
German  behaviour  patterns  have  tended  rather  to  widen  than  to  converge,  and  the 
impression is created that, if at all, there could be a greater convergence of the Western 
German to the Eastern German behavioural patterns.    
 
Table 1:  Women of the 1970 cohort
1 in Eastern Germany by marital status and  
  number of children, 2000 and 2004 (in %)  
 









child(ren)   
2000  8.2  38.1  26.9  26.8  100.0 
2004  3.8  48.9  19.0  28.3  100.0 
 
Source: Federal Statistical Office, Germany, Micro census. 
Note: 
1 Without women still living in the parents’ household.  
 
 
The high share of extramarital live births of necessity highlights the question of 
whether the parents marry after the birth of the children, or whether there has been an 
increase  in  the  share  of  non-marital  cohabitation  with  children.  To  examine  the 
question,  data  from  the  Microcensus  are  evaluated.  Here,  the  birth  cohort  1970  is 
viewed in 2000 and 2004 in the classification of civil status and living together with 
children (Table 1). Women still living in the parental household are not included in the 
data.  
This distribution shown in the table is an expression, first, of the early birth of 
children, which was still typical of the situation in the new federal Länder when the 
1970 cohort reached reproductive age; and, second, of the high share of women who Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 17 
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were unmarried at the time of the birth of their children. This spread changed somewhat 
by 2004. The share of women who live unmarried with child(ren) in a household has 
fallen, and the share of married women with child(ren) has risen to almost one half 
(49%). This shows that the decoupling of marriage and children has not advanced as far 
as might, at first glance, appear to be the case. Furthermore, the increase in the share of 
those who are married with children indicates that a large share of Eastern Germans do 
not marry until after the birth of children. Having said that, the share of those who are 
unmarried  with  child(ren),  at  28%,  remains  relatively  high,  which  indicates  the 
continuation of the behavioural pattern of “children yes, marriage no”. 
In order to explain the West-East differences, various hypotheses have been very 
recently developed which consider influences on both extramarital births and on the 
tendency  to  marry  (Huinink,  Konietzka  2003  68  ff).  The  various  approaches  are 
summarised below: 
Better institutional childcare in combination with a widespread work orientation 
leads to higher female employment in the new federal Länder. Women are hence more 
economically  independent,  and  are  less  likely  to  marry  for  reasons  of  economic 
security. In Western Germany, by contrast, child-oriented marriage with the goal of 
economic security plays a more significant role. 
Single  parents  in  Germany  receive  childcare  places  preferentially.  Supply  has 
become scarcer in the new federal Länder, although the situation is more favourable 
than in the West. Therefore, again because many women intend to keep working after 
having children, family policies have created incentives not to marry, or to postpone 
marriage.  
Extramarital parenthood is more of a social norm in the new federal Länder. The 
so-called  extramarital  rate  was  already  very  high  in  the  former  GDR  in  the  1980s, 
whilst in the West the norm of child-oriented marriage is still very widespread.  
The changed character of the social institution of marriage and family after the end 
of the GDR leads to reticence towards marriage. Although the marriage rate was very 
high, marriage and family were de-institutionalised to a greater degree, particularly by 
the liberal divorce law (Salles 2005). The introduction of Western German divorce law 
has made the cost of divorce higher, making it easier to decide against marriage.  
Konietzka and Kreyenfeld (2005, 56) used data of the Microcensus to examine the 
socio-structural differentiations of the process: "The analyses have shown that a low 
educational  attainment  in  East  and  West  Germany  increases  the  probability  that  a 
woman  remains  single  after  the  birth  of  a  child.  However,  the  determinants  of 
unmarried partnerships are different. In the West, women with educational attainments 
qualifying  for  university  entrance  ("Abitur")  are  a  bit  more  likely  to  live  in 
cohabitations than women with a medium or low educational attainment are. However, 
there  is  no  such  interdependency  in  the  East.  There,  women  with  a  school-leaving Dorbritz: Germany: Family diversity with low actual and desired fertility 
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certificate qualifying for university entrance ("Abitur") do not cohabit more frequently 
than women with a medium or low educational attainment. The persons most likely to 
live  in  unmarried  partnerships  are  mothers  without  or  with  only  a  low  educational 
attainment. This result contradicts the expectation that a higher formal education – as an 
indicator  of  increased  orientation  toward  economic  independence  –  positively 
influences a person's decision in favour of an unmarried partnership as the preferred 




3 and divorce  
The low-fertility situation in Germany is accompanied by a very low marriage level. 
The  trends  in  the  Total  First  Marriage  Rate  hardly  differ  from  those  of  the  Total 
Fertility Rate. In Western Germany, the tendency to marry has decreased alongside the 
TFR from the second fall in the TFR onward. Given the age-specific first marriage 
patterns for 1971, 93.4% of women and 86.8% of men would enter into a first marriage 
in the course of their lives. The value for 1980 was, however, only 84.1% for women 
and 76.5% for men. The inclination to marry has fallen gradually to the present day. 
Only 76.8% of women, and as few as 66.6% of men, would ever enter into a first 
marriage given the age-specific first marriage patterns for 2004. 
As was also the case with fertility, the originally high inclination to marry was 
maintained  in  Eastern  Germany  until  the  end  of  the  former  GDR.  The  Total  First 
Marriage Rate (TFMR) for 1971, at around 96% for both women and men, implied that 
almost the entire population would marry at least once in their lives. Although this very 
high level did not hold up, in the second half of the 1980s the Total First Marriage Rate 
was still 90.0% for women and 85.1% for men. The inclination to marry was hence 
much higher than in Western Germany. With the end of the GDR, and the collapse in 
fertility, the marriage rates also fell sharply. The pattern of the universality of marriage 
dissolved. Since then, the TFMR has been lower than in Western Germany. In 2004, it 
was only 69% for women and 57% for men in Eastern Germany. 
Since the 1960s, the Total Divorce Rate (TDR) in Germany has been characterised 
by a continuous upward trend,  which  was interrupted once in Western and Eastern 
Germany,  respectively  (Figure 8).  In  Germany  as  a  whole,  the  Total  Divorce  Rate 
reached a value of 42.5% in 2004. It was 43.6% in Western Germany and 37.4% in 
Eastern Germany (calculated up to a duration of marriage of 25 years). The data shown 
                                                            
3 The results on the first marriage rate are based on shortened first marriage tables (up to age 50), in 
calculating of which both the first marriage probability of single persons and the mortality probability of 
single persons was input. Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 17 
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in Figure 8 reveal two divorce rate lows; namely, in 1978 in Western Germany, and in 
1991 in Eastern Germany. Both were caused by amendments to the divorce law. The 
divorce law was amended in Western Germany in 1977, when the fault principle was 
replaced by the principle of irreconcilability. The vital aspect here was that the divorce 
procedure no longer sought to identify the guilty party in the separation, but only to 
determine a state of irreconcilability, and that a separation year was prescribed prior to 
divorce. This caused a delay in the finalizing of divorces when the law first went into 
effect. Exactly the same thing then happened in 1991 in the former GDR. The transfer 
of Western German divorce law to Eastern Germany, with the prescribed separation 
year, led to a short-term delay in the completion of pending divorces.  
Since  the  divorce  rates  increased  from  a  substantially  lower  level  across  the 
observation period, divorce rates for marriage cohorts do not yet reach the high values 
of recent period TDRs. The highest value of 32.9% was reached by the marriage cohort 
1980 after 24 years of marriage. Lower values are found for the older and younger 
marriage cohorts. The older cohorts were not yet exposed to such high divorce risks in 
the  first  years  of  marriage.  For  instance,  27.1%  of  the  marriage  cohort  1969  had 
divorced by 2004, after a 35-year marriage duration. The younger cohorts record lower 
values since they have not yet been exposed to the risk of divorce for as long. However, 
28.7% of the marriage cohort 1989 is already divorced after 15 years of marriage. The 
cohort divorce rate for these marriage cohorts will reach the 40% mark if the period 
TDR remains at its current level.   
The higher divorce rate of the ex-GDR is also associated with the high level of 
women's  employment:  "The  empirical  analyses  based  on  the  German  ‘Family  and 
Fertility Survey’ (1992) show that East-German women have a significantly higher risk 
of divorce, resulting primarily from the fact that religious ties were less pronounced, 
more  women  already  experienced  a  divorce  in  the  parent  generation  and  women's 
employment was higher in the GDR. In both countries women's employment involved a 
higher risk of divorce, but the effect was stronger in the FRG than in the GDR. This 
investigation confirms that the divergences between East and West German divorce 
rates  are  mainly  caused  by  the  different  socio-structural  composition  of  the  two 
populations. In addition, it suggests that the negative interrelation between a woman's 
employment  and  the  stability  of  marriage  is  weaker  in  partnerships  which  are 
dominated  by  egalitarian,  rather  than  traditional,  role  expectations"  (Böttcher  2006, 
592). 
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Source: Federal Statistical Office, Germany. 




3. The change in living arrangements and family forms  
The analyses below are based on the data of the German Microcensus, an annual 1% 
sample which has been evaluated for 2004. These data contain a combination of the 
characteristics  of  civil  status,  partnership  status,  and  parenthood  status,  making  it 
possible to break down the population into twelve living arrangements (Table 2). Two 
evaluation paths are pursued. On the one hand, the structure of the living arrangements 
for 2004 is observed in the age group 35 to 39, separately for Western and Eastern 
Germany, and for women and men. It is necessary to concentrate on this age group 
since  the  German  Microcensus  only  asks  for  the  number  of  children  living  in  the 
household, and not for the number of children born. The birth of children is no longer as 
frequent in this age group, and the probability that children have already moved out of 
their parents’ home is not yet very high, so that the structure of living arrangements at 
the end of the family formation phase is depicted. On the other hand, the age-specific Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 17 
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course of the process of family formation and dissolution is observed. To this end, the 
situation in 2004 in Germany is analysed, differentiated by five-year age groups.  
It can be determined at the start that the traditional family (married parents with at 
least one child) is the living arrangement most frequently selected. Having said that, 
only slightly more than half of the population in the age group of 35–39 lives in this 
arrangement. Among Eastern German men, it is, in fact, less than half of the population, 
at  47.7%.  This  is  one  of  the  major  trends  in  the  changes  in  living  arrangements. 
Although the majority of the population continues to live in core families, the absolute 
dominance of this living arrangement has declined. Also, no new living arrangements 
have come about, but only the shares have changed in favour of extramarital living 
arrangements.  
A close link between marriage and having children is typical of Germany. If one 
takes  a  detailed  view,  the  intact  two-child  family  is  the  most  widespread  living 
arrangement. Thirty percent of Western German women and 25.8% of Western German 
men are married and have two children. In Eastern Germany, it is 26.6% of women and 
22.4% of men. This living arrangement no longer represents the largest share among 
Eastern German men, with this position being taken by those who live alone and have 
no children, at 26.9%. The shares of married couples with one child or with three and 
more children are relatively small.  
Single parenthood is not uncommon among women – this living arrangement was 
experienced by 10.1% of women in Western Germany and 16.3% of women in Eastern 
Germany. This is above all a consequence of the high divorce rate, and is mainly to be 
regarded as a transitional living arrangement until a new partnership is formed. There 
are hardly any single male parents in Germany. In the observed age group, it is only 
1.1% in the West, and 1.8% in the East. The rate of non-marital cohabitation  with 
children is also low. It is especially low in the West, at around 4%, and somewhat 
higher in the East, at roughly 13%. 
Finally, a polarisation in the living arrangements has occurred in Germany. This is 
represented  in  the  high  shares  of  childless  living  arrangements:  26.7%  of  Western 
German and 14.4 % of Eastern German women do not live with children. This share is 
again much higher among men, at 42.1% in the West and 36.8% in the East. The largest 
group among the childless is formed by those who live as single persons in a one-
person household.  
There  are  still  divergent  patterns  of  family  formation  in  Germany.  One  finds 
unambiguous  differences  in  the  living  arrangements  between  Western  and  Eastern 
Germans, and between women and men. The intra-German differences are typified by 
three characteristics. First, the polarisation already mentioned is more widespread in 
Western Germany. It is found both among women and among men. Childlessness is, by 
contrast, still relatively low among Eastern German women, at 14.4%. Polarisation can Dorbritz: Germany: Family diversity with low actual and desired fertility 
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also be found among Eastern German men. Second, the one-child family is much more 
commonplace in Eastern Germany: 39.3% of women in Eastern Germany and 24.2% in 
Western Germany live with one child in the household. Third, the share of families with 
three  and  more  children  is  higher  in  the  West  than  in  the  East:  14.3%  in  Western 
Germany,  but  9.7%  in  Eastern  Germany.  These  three  characteristics  give  rise  to 
different patterns of family formation, which, however, lead to very similar fertility 
rates. A low TFR can be observed in Western Germany because childlessness is very 
high. The TFR is very low in Eastern Germany because one-child families are frequent. 
The high childlessness is compensated for in Western Germany by a larger share of 
families  with  three  or  more  children.  This  can  be  regarded  as  an  additional 
characteristic of the polarised situation.  
 
Table 2:  Population by living arrangements in Germany 2004,  
  ages 35 to 39 (in %)  
 
Living arrangements  Western Germany  Eastern Germany  
  Number of children  
  Women 
  0  1  2  3+  Total  0  1  2  3+  Total 
Family forms                     
Married couples with 
children    16.4  30.0  12.5  58.9    23.0  26.6  6.9  56.6 
Cohabitation with 
children    2.5  1.4  0.4  4.2    6.7  4.5  1.4  12.6 
Single parents    5.3  3.5  1.4  10.1    9.6  5.4  1.3  16.3 
Non-family forms                     
Married couples without 
children  9.6        9.6  4.3        4.3 
Cohabitation without 
children  5.0        5.0  3.3        3.3 
Singles   12.1        12.1  6.6        6.6 
Total  26.7  24.2  34.8  14.3  100.0  14.4  39.3  36.5  9.7  100.0 
  Men 
Family forms   
Married couples with 
children    16.5  25.8  10.1  52.5    19.9  22.4  5.4  47.7 
Cohabitation with 
children    2.6  1.3  0.4  4.3    8.1  4.5  1.0  13.6 
Single parents    0.7  0.3  0.1  1.1    1.3  0.4  0.1  1.8 
Non-family forms                     
Married couples without 
children  10.3        10.3  4.6        4.6 
Cohabitation without 
children  7.0        7.0  5.3        5.3 
Singles   24.9        24.9  26.9        26.9 
Total  42.1  19.8  27.5  10.6  100.0  36.8  29.3  27.3  6.5  100.0 
 
Source: Federal Statistical Office, Germany, Microcensus 2004. Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 17 
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The data for Germany as a whole in Table 3 show how living arrangements change 
over  a  person’s  lifetime.  To  this  end,  the  2004  Microcensus  listed  the  living 
arrangement concepts in five age groups between the ages of 20 and 44. Singles are the 
dominant group among 20- to 24-year-olds, at 51.8%. These are individuals who either 
live in a one-person household, or who still live in their parents’ homes, and who do not 
have a partner. The second-largest group, at 22.3%, are women and men who are in 
non-marital  cohabitation  without  children.  Both  living  arrangements  rapidly  lose 
significance with advancing age and the start of family formation. The share of singles 
remains comparatively high; it is 18.1% in the age group 35–39, and 15.9% in the age 
group  40–44.  Singles  form  the  second-largest  group  in  the  age  group  35–39, 
constituting a higher share of the population than families with one child or three or 
more  children.  The  very  rapid  drop  in  shares  of  non-marital  cohabitation  without 
children  indicates  that  this  living  arrangement  constitutes  a  preliminary  stage  for 
transition to other forms. The share of childless married couples fluctuates at around 
one-tenth  in  all  groups.  This  is  a  result  which  was  already  found  in  a  number  of 
analyses. It can be presumed that this is an effect of German family policy, which links 
high  transfer  payments  to  marriage.  The  shares  of  non-marital  cohabitation  with 
children remain very low in all age groups. This is illustrated by the saying, “if children, 
then marriage”. The share of single parents also remains low, but reaches its highest 
level in the age group 40–44. As previously discussed, this is an effect of the high and 
rising divorce rate. With advancing age, married couples with children represent the 
largest shares of the population. Married people with children still constitute a narrow 
majority  among  the  population,  although  the  loss  of  significance  of  this  living 
arrangement is clearly indicated in the data.   
However, the forms of living arrangements have changed less dramatically than is 
generally assumed. What can be stated in general terms is that biographies have become 
more  diversified  and  can  be  shaped  individually  to  a  larger  extent.  Apart  from  the 
described polarisation in the external structural features of life cycles, which is still a 
cause of controversial discussions in the demographic literature (cf. Nave-Herz, 2002: 
379), there are other factors, which are stressed in unison, such as a destandardisation of 
biographies  in  family  development,  a  multiplication  of  internal  structural  forms  of 
family life organisation, and a weakened acceptance of normative institutions, such as 
marriage  and  family  (see  Marbach  1996:  23).  In  this  context,  the  theses  of 
deinstitutionalisation and individualisation are discussed in the sociological literature on 
families. The term deinstitutionalisation means that an individual's rules, concepts and 
views lose some of their obligatory character with regard to family formation and forms 
of  family  living.  This  also  relates  to  the  thesis  of  individualisation.  The  essential 
statement  is  that,  in  a  society  which  is  in  a  process  of  modernisation,  people  are 
released from the traditional structures dominated by normative rules, which means a Dorbritz: Germany: Family diversity with low actual and desired fertility 
582    http://www.demographic-research.org 
higher degree of freedom of choice also with regard to family formation (Huinink and 
Konietzka, 2007: 104f.). 
 
Table 3:  Population by living arrangements and age groups 
  in Germany 2004 (in %) 
 
Living arrangements/Number of children  Age groups (years) 
    20–24  25–29  30–34  35–39  40–44 
Married couples with 
children 
1  6.8  13.6  17.7  17.3  18.4 
  2  2.3  9.4  19.8  27.5  28.8 
  3+  0.4  2.4  6.3  10.5  11.1 
Cohabitation with children  1  3.6  4.2  4.2  3.3  2.4 
  2  0.7  1.1  1.8  1.8  1.4 
  3+  0.1  0.3  0.5  0.5  0.5 
Single parents  1  3.3  2.9  3.0  3.4  4.2 
  2  0.5  1.0  1.5  2.1  2.3 
  3+  0.0  0.2  0.5  0.7  0.7 
Married couples without 
children 
  8.2  11.7  10.7  9.1  10.1 
Cohabitation without 
children 
  22.3  18.4  10.5  5.7  4.2 
Singles     51.8  34.8  23.5  18.1  15.9 
Total    100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
 
Source: Federal Statistical Office, Germany, Microcensus 2004. 
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4. Desired number of children and reasons for not wanting a(nother) 
child – Results of the Population Policy Acceptance Study  
4.1 Desired fertility  
Having repeatedly discussed the issue of increasing childlessness, it appears relevant to 
investigate whether the desire to remain childless can be found in the attitudes of the 
population. To do so, the data of the international Population Policy Acceptance Study 




Table 4:  Desired number of children in Germany, 2004 (%, average)  
 
Number of children  Western Germany  Eastern Germany 
  Female  Male  Female  Male 
No children  16.6  27.2  5.8  21.1 
One child  14.5  13.0  28.7  24.2 
Two children  53.7  40.0  50.6  45.0 
Three children  11.6  16.2  11.6  7.6 
Four children or more  3.7  3.5  3.3  2.0 
Average  1.73  1.59  1.78  1.46 
 
Source: German Population Policy Acceptance Study. 
 
 
The investigations carried out by Fahey and Speder (2004: 19 et seq.) have already 
revealed very low desired fertility in Germany. This is confirmed by the results of the 
PPAS (Tab. 4). Women in Western Germany desire on average 1.73 children, and those 
in Eastern Germany, 1.78. This is the lowest calculated value in the comparative group 
of PPAS countries. Desired fertility among men is once again much lower than among 
women. Western German men would like to have on average 1.59 children, and Eastern 
German men as few as 1.46. Desired fertility is low in Germany because the share of 
those who would like to remain childless is very high. This is particularly common 
                                                            
4 “DIALOG - Population Policy Acceptance Study - The Viewpoint of Citizens and Policy Actors Regarding 
the Management of Population Related Change” (PPAS) is an international comparative research project 
investigating the attitudes of the population towards demographic change and towards population policies. 
Fourteen European countries participated. Around 4,000 individuals in the age group of 20 – 64 were 
surveyed in Germany in 2003 in the context of this project. First results are published in: Polska Akademia 
Nauk, Studia Demograficzne, Nr 2/148, 2005, 125 pages. Dorbritz: Germany: Family diversity with low actual and desired fertility 
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among men: 27.2 % of Western German and 21.1% of Eastern German men would like 
to remain childless. The share of those who wish to remain childless is lower among 
women, but it is still as high as 16.6% in the West. Eastern German women constitute 
an exception here: only 5.8% do not want to have children. Despite the lower desired 
fertility, the two-child family is still the family size most frequently aspired to. Among 
women, 69.0% (West) and 65.5% (East) want to have two or more children. Among 
men, these shares are 59.7% (West) and 54.6% (East). The main conclusion of these 
observations  is  that  the  special  demographic  situations  are  also  reflected  in  desired 
fertility. This applies from a dual point of view. First, the high level of childlessness in 
Western Germany is an element of low desired fertility. The new German childlessness 
is thus likely to take on the nature of voluntary childlessness. This is to be further 
observed in the section below using the desired fertility of women and men who do not 
(yet) have children. Second, desired fertility shows the course of the different family 
formation patterns in Western and Eastern Germany. This is noticeable in particular 
among women. When it comes to the desired fertility of Western German women, the 
polarisation described above in the context of living arrangements can be seen here as 
well. The desire not to have any children is widespread, at 16.6%. Only a small number 
want to have only one child, at 14.5%. The desire for two children is then relatively 
common once more, at 53.7%. Remaining childless or founding a family with two or 
more  children  are  behavioural  alternatives  in  desired  fertility.  This  virtually  never 
occurs in Eastern Germany. The share of  women  with zero desired fertility is only 
5.8%. By contrast, the desire for only one child, at 28.7%, is highly commonplace. 
Differentiation  by  age  groups  provides  further  information  on  the  change  in 
desired fertility. It appears to be important here that there is evidently no change in 
desired  fertility  among  younger  respondents.  Among  young  men,  indeed,  the  effect 
occurs that the under-twenties desire even fewer children than the average (e.g., 1.74 in 
the age group 25 to 29). This puts in place a condition that supports the presumption of 
long-term low fertility in Germany.  
 
 
4.2 Arguments for not having children  
Table 5 presents the reasons which the PPAS respondents considered to be important in 
deciding  against  the  birth  of  a(nother)  child.  A  distinction  is  made  among  the 
respondents as to whether they already have children or whether they are childless. In 
general terms, the statement, “I already have all the children I want”, predominates 
among the arguments for not wanting children. This comes as no surprise for a variety 
of reasons. Some of the older members of the age group 20 to 44 have already reached 
their desired fertility. It should be borne in mind here that desired fertility is very low, Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 17 
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and that its limit is, therefore, reached quickly. What is more, those who do not want to 
have children are also included, and these respondents then state that they already have 
all the children they want. Of almost equal significance in the decision against having 
another  child  are  concerns  about  the  future  and  the  desire  to  retain  one’s  current 
standard of living. For those who live without a partner, not having a suitable partner is 
also a highly relevant argument. 
 
Table 5:  Reasons for not wanting a(nother) child in Germany  
  (very important and important / %)  
 
Reasons for not wanting a (nother) child  Without children  With child(ren) 
(Scale points very important and important)  Female  Male  Female  Male 
I already have all the children I want  62.8  55.2  81.8  74.7 
My state of health does not allow it  22.3  15.1  24.4  12.5 
My job and professional activities would not allow it  42.0  39.2  33.4  23.7 
I would have to give up leisure time interests  55.4  47.9  16.1  18.1 
I want to maintain my present standard of living  67.1  61.0  47.8  45.4 
A(nother) child would cost too much  39.2  49.8  44.4  44.7 
I am too concerned about the future my children 
will have 
56.1  54.9  55.4  54.4 
I would not be able to enjoy life as I have so far  59.5  51.9  23.0  25.6 
I am/ my partner is too old  25.5  20.2  36.3  30.7 
I live alone and I don’t have a steady partner  67.1  71.2  68.2  58.1 
My partner does not want a(nother) child  30.0  21.0  30.4  30.6 
My partnership does not work the way I would like 
it to 
22.4  14.8  18.0  20.0 
 
Source: German Population Policy Acceptance Study. 
 
 
There are considerable differences in reasons given for not wanting another child 
between  the  childless  respondents  and  the  respondents  with  children.  The  childless 
worry most frequently that they would be unable to maintain their standard of living: 
67% of women and 61% of men rated this consideration as important or very important. 
Among those with children, only 48% of women and 45% of men called this reason 
important.  The  differences  between  the  two  groups  were  even  clearer  in  the  other 
reasons mentioned. Fifty-nine percent of childless women and 52% of childless men 
attached very considerable significance to the reason, “I would not be able to enjoy life Dorbritz: Germany: Family diversity with low actual and desired fertility 
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as I have so far”. Among respondents with children, this reason was rated as important 
by 23% of women and 26% of men. Similar differences can be found in the responses 
to the reason, “I would have to give up leisure time interests”: 55% (women) and 48% 
(men) of the childless respondents rated this as important, compared with 16% (women) 
and 18% (men) of respondents with children. Noticeable differences can also be found 
in attitudes towards gainful employment. Among the childless, 42% of women and 39% 
of men judged the reason, “My job and professional activities would not allow it”, to be 
important or very important. Among those with children, this share was only 33% and 
24%, respectively. By contrast, no clear deviations in response patterns were found 
when it came to other reasons (worried about the future, health, dysfunctional marriage, 
partner is against it, cost of having children). 
In this context, a strategy that may prove promising is the erosion of the traditional 
life cycle. The classical life cycle, which is still popular today, must be extricated from 
the  trichotomy  of  phases  child/partner/pensioner.  By  breaking  it  down  into  discrete 
phases, not necessarily in chronological succession, it would be possible to relieve the 
presently enormous stress in a person's "rush hour of life" caused by the concomitance 
of  family  formation  and  career  start.  In  this  context,  the  German  Family  Report 
Commission in its seventh family report (2005) suggested the introduction of so-called 
‘option times’, which would be similar to parental leave. It seems important that option 
times do not appear to be of inferior value when compared with a person's professional 
career and a rise in salary, because otherwise option times would again be used by 
women only. Consequently, it is very important to develop a model that is gender-
neutral. Scientific research on this subject shows that the related biographic options are 
at  present  hardly  accepted.  "The  first  biographic  option,  namely  early  motherhood 
combining education and family formation, seems to hardly exist in Germany. …The 
second  biographic  option,  timing  motherhood  after  the  achievement  of  a  career 
position, is overshadowed by the artificial ‘horror threshold 35’. After that age, doctors 
automatically  speak  of  late  births  and  high-risk  pregnancies.  Mother  and  child  are 
supposed to be subject to a higher health risk” (Allmendiger and Dressel, 2005, 27f.). 
Aside from these implications for future innovative life-cycle strategies, the main 
conclusion  to  be  drawn  from  the  results  presented  in  this  section  is  that  it  is  the 
importance attributed to individualistic reasons for not wanting a(nother) child in which 
the childless differ most starkly from parents. According to these results, there is a 
group in the population who decide against having children because of individualistic 
orientations. 
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5. Paradigm shift – a family policy with demographically desirable 
effects?  
The topic of population policy was and remains largely taboo in Germany after the 
experience  at  the  time  of  the  Third  Reich.  A  reorientation  appears  to  have  gotten 
underway in the recent past, however. This can be described using two quotations, first 
from  the  declaration  of  the  Federal  Republic  for  the  International  Conference  for 
Population and Development in Cairo 1994, and, second, from a study by the Federal 
Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth. The position which 
was illustrated in a declaration for the Cairo Conference applied to the Federal Republic 
of  Germany  for  a  long  time:  “Family  policy  in  general  and  specific  family  policy 
measures have an independent significance for the Federal Government, which is based 
not  lastly  on  population  relevant  considerations;  desirable  demographic  side-effects 
may nevertheless occur. The State must respect different notions of family life and 
guarantee parents’ freedom to decide on the number and time of birth of their children” 
(Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1993: 16). The latter position is also unbreakable today. 
However, the term population-orientated family policy has certainly become common 
usage today, and the goal of “implementable desired fertility” has been more clearly 
worded. “Sustainable, population-orientated family policy does not mean that people 
are to be persuaded to want children. Rather, it is to help people to achieve their desired 
fertility with the aid of better infrastructures, accompanied by a newly-centred financial 
promotion and by a family-friendly corporate culture” (Bundesministerium für Familie, 
Senioren, Frauen und Jugend, 2004: 3). The reorientation in policy, the media and the 
public in this area is to be attributed to demographic change. Two aspects should be 
emphasised: First, the low-fertility situation which has lasted for 30 years has led to an 
ageing of the population, giving rise to a threat to the social security systems, affecting 
in particular the pension and health insurance systems, with other impacts anticipated in 
a large number of social areas. Second, the high level of childlessness creates additional 
problems in the area of long-term care insurance for the elderly. A major share of the 
future elderly population will not have family members to care for them because they 
have remained childless, and will hence rely on costly social long-term care institutions.  
As a result of these and other constraints, awareness has been rising that an ageing, 
shrinking society must face the problem of low fertility. This appears to be possible 
only if a changed concept of family policy is implemented. The German government 
was also advised of the need for new policy approaches in the family report published 
in 2006. The committee of experts ultimately declared that the previous concept of 
family policy in Germany is no longer up to date, and that there is an urgent need for a 
paradigm shift (Sachverständigenkommission 2006).  Dorbritz: Germany: Family diversity with low actual and desired fertility 
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The  concept  which  has  evolved  in  this  context  is  that  of  a  sustainable  family 
policy.  "Sustainable  family  policy  aims  at  increasing  the  birth  rate  and  promoting 
women's  employment.  That  is  the  basic  concept  that  differentiates  it  from  a  more 
conservatively defined family policy, which associates the goal of increasing the birth 
rate  with  a  reduction  in  women's  employment.  Sustainable  family  policy  aims  to 
improve  mothers'  involvement  in  working  life  in  order  to  alleviate  the  poverty  of 
families and children. In contrast, the approach in line  with  the traditional position 
would be to alleviate the poverty of families by extending financial transfers. What 
plays  an  important  role  in  a  sustainable  family  policy  is  the  improvement  of  the 
conditions which allow women and men to reconcile work and family life" (Rürup and 
Gruescu 2005, 3). 
German  family policy to date can be characterised as follows. It is typical  for 
family policy to take place in the context of the dual compensation of family burdens in 
the form of monetary compensation for parents’ expenditures. The transfer payments 
are very much linked to marriage. Between 150 and 165 billion Euros were spent per 
year on this compensation in the past. Germany thus occupies a medium ranking in 
international comparisons, when the share of payments to families is measured against 
gross domestic product. The disadvantage of the German concept of family policy has 
been so far that it is orientated towards the male breadwinner model. The orientation of 
family policy can be referred to as a concept of the modernised breadwinner marriage. 
According to Anne Gauthier (1996: 203 et seqq.), the so-called “pro-traditional model”, 
in which reconcilability of family and work is made difficult, but a relatively large 
amount of money is invested in marriage and families, is typical of Germany. Vital 
importance is attached to the fact that Germany is a conservative welfare state in which 
the traditional perception of women’s role is supported by family policy. This creates 
situations in which many women must decide between a traditional maternal role and 
gainful  employment  in  the  face  of  simultaneous,  equally  strong  aspirations  towards 
women’s emancipation, in particular women’s orientation towards gainful employment. 
Hence,  the  7th  Family  Report  of  the  Federal  Government  cannot  but  reach  the 
following  conclusion:  “A  sustainable  family  policy  does  not  attempt  to  simply 
modernise the model of the family which has come about in industrial society on the 
basis of two separate spheres, namely the domestic and the vocational, by retaining the 
structure of this model, whilst at the same time merely making it easier for mothers with 
children  to  better  combine  work  and  family  by  improving  the  infrastructure” 
(Sachverständigenkommission, 2005: 455). The problem of German family policy is 
that a traditional understanding has been retained for many years in which the change in 
women’s  circumstances,  above  all,  the  aspirations  of  the  very  highly-educated 
generation  of  younger  women  to  enter  the  labour  market,  was  underestimated,  and 
women were thrown back into the role of child care-giver and men into the breadwinner Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 17 
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role. And, assuming that women manage to attain gainful employment, it was up to 
them in most cases to solve the reconciliation problem, whilst men remained in the full-
time breadwinner role. However, in addition to accomplishing a large number of tasks, 
the model of change to come needs to perform two main functions: namely, it must 
improve the ability of women to reconcile parenthood and gainful employment, and it 
must break up the traditional gender-specific role attributions. Such a paradigm shift in 
family policy is now beginning to occur, and also has a demographic foundation. That 
family policy means shaping society has, at least, been recognized. “Families need a 
coordinated web of deliberate measures in the areas infrastructure, time and money. 
What  is  therefore  needed  is  a  policy  mix  which  aims  to  expand  childcare,  provide 
families with effective financial support and loosen the tight time constraints to which 
young  families  are  subjected  by  improving  the  reconciliation  of  family  and  work”, 
according to a conclusion on the homepage of the Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, 
Senior Citizens, Women and Youth (2006). Over and above this, an urgent pro-family 
mentality change in all areas of society appears to be indicated.  
 
 
6. Discussion of results: Nine causes of low fertility  
Low  fertility  in  Germany  is  naturally  not  related  solely  to  the  traditional,  outdated 
concept of family policy. The causes of a specific trend in fertility development are 
always  linked  with  a  multi-structured  and  differentiated  social  development.  The 
German demographic reference material frequently mentions the concept, developed by 
Franz-Xaver Kaufmann (1995), of the structural lack of consideration on the part of 
society towards the interests of families. This means, for example, a lack of childcare 
options,  inflexible  working  hours,  or  too  little  and  too  expensive  family-friendly 
housing. In line with this concept, the author considers it necessary to list the nine 
causes of low fertility he considers as most important, some of which closely overlap: 
 
 
6.1 Individualisation trends  
The  social  change  expressed  in  the  concept  of  Europe’s  Second  Demographic 
Transition,  and  based  on  individualisation  trends  in  society,  has  contributed  to  re-
orientation in family formation. A group has now become established in the population 
in Germany consisting of people who do not have children, and who do not want any. 
This can be primarily presumed to be a reaction to German  unfriendliness towards 
children, but one may also presume that a culture of childlessness and low fertility is 
coming into being. This is also indicated by the reasons this group cites as important in Dorbritz: Germany: Family diversity with low actual and desired fertility 
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the  decision  not  to  have  children;  namely,  giving  up  leisure  time  interests,  doing 
without  a  career,  and  loss  of  prosperity.  Social  prejudice  against  people  who  have 
children is, from a cultural point of view, a result of individualist life views in which 
children and related expenditures are regarded as a private matter.  
 
 
6.2 Childlessness  
At least in Western Germany, childlessness is an important element of the pattern of 
family  formation.  We  can  therefore  speak  about  an  emergence  of  a  culture  of 
childlessness.  It  became  so  widespread  because  of  the  necessity  to  choose  between 
family  and  gainful  employment  that  was  implied  by  the  prevailing  circumstances. 
Unfavourable conditions for reconciling family and work, particularly the insufficient 
number of childcare places for the under-threes, force women to choose between work 
and children. Having children is almost equivalent to leaving work. For this reason, 
particularly among younger women, and, again significantly more so among highly-
qualified younger women, the decision against having children is taken more and more 
frequently.  These  originally  rational  decisions  have  now  become  a  generative, 
culturally-independent pattern. Desired childlessness has today become a part of the 
lifestyle.  This  still  small  group  in  the  population  does  not  regard  children  as  an 
enrichment to life; children do not fit in  with their own identity. This attitude also 
entails a disinterest in family policy. The decision not to have children is deeply-rooted, 
and also cannot be changed by re-thinking family policy. This has consequences for 
fertility rates. A simple example to make this clear: If – allowing for childlessness of 
26% - the simple replacement of the parents’ generation (average of 2.08 children) is to 
be achieved, 65% of women would have to have at least three children. Such a severe 
change in the pattern of reproductive behaviour appears to be outright utopian.  
 
 
6.3 The concept of family policy  
Family policy has a long tradition in Germany, but is considered to be a failure in terms 
of its influence on fertility. As already discussed in Section 5, German family policy to 
date has had a traditional orientation. It is based on a concept  which is centred on 
monetary  support  and  promotes  the  breadwinner  model,  in  which  childcare  is 
considered to be a private matter. Women are largely forced to leave the labour market 
when a child is born. The concept of family policy does not help to reduce the pressure 
to decide, and hence makes it easier to decide not to have children. A family policy Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 17 
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concept  is  called  for  which  makes  it  possible  to  choose  between  the  breadwinner-
housewife model and the reconciliation model.   
 
 
6.4 The reconciliation conditions  
In  the  availability  of  childcare  facilities,  Germany  ranks  among  the  poorest  in  EU 
comparison. Women, however, no longer consider becoming housewives and mothers 
their main raison d’être. This purpose-giving area of life has remained, but has been 
supplemented  by  the  idea  of  self-realisation  through  gainful  employment.  Since 
reconciliation of the two areas remains difficult, and given that women cannot look to 
family policy for help, corners have to be cut in one or both areas. A reaction to this is 
to shift births to a later age. Young women are, as a rule, very highly-educated, and 
want to use and refine this capital on the labour market. The postponement of family 
formation which this makes necessary is one path that can lead to childlessness. The 
realisation of desired fertility is delayed for so long that a childless lifestyle has become 
a habit, or no suitable partner can be found for family formation. A second option is to 
do without children among the highly-qualified or career-orientated who are unwilling 
to forego a high income or qualified vocational position because of children.  
 
 
6.5 The gender problem  
Whilst  the  Northern  European  countries,  for  instance,  have  practiced  a  consistent 
equality  policy  for  a  long  time,  the  male  breadwinner  biography  with  women  as 
housewives  is  still  the  norm  in  Germany.  Germany  has  fallen  into  the  so-called 
emancipation  trap  with  this  situation.  By  contrast,  gender  relations,  and  the  role  of 
women in general, together with the institution of the family, have undergone profound 
changes in recent decades. The traditional model of the middle-class family with the 
man as breadwinner, in which the woman is assigned to the role of housewife, has been 
increasingly questioned. When it comes to the division of tasks within families, studies 
repeatedly  confirm  that,  despite  changes  in  participation  by  women  on  the  labour 
market, most of the domestic work continues to be carried out by women. The change 
in the gender roles has taken place asymmetrically, i.e., only on the part of women. 
While  housework  and  childcare  have  remained  central  tasks  for  women,  gainful 
employment outside the home has been added to this. The perception of men towards 
family work and childcare, by contrast, has remained unchanged – men’s commitment 
to these areas of reconciliation tends to be more auxiliary in nature. Men in couples 
where both earn money continue to regard family and work as separate areas of life, and Dorbritz: Germany: Family diversity with low actual and desired fertility 
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focus on non-domestic gainful employment. Women, by contrast, have fallen into the 
reconciliation trap because of the change in the gender roles, and regard themselves as 
being forced to overcome the tension between non-domestic gainful employment, or, 
indeed, career opportunities, and the traditional role allocation within the family. This 
means  that  opting  for  a  child  in  Germany  has  become  a  decisive  competitive 
disadvantage  for  women.  Despite  rapid  social  change,  very  little  has  happened, 
particularly in the area of the traditional allocation of the gender roles. 
 
 
6.6 The change in the forms of cohabitation in partnerships – de-
institutionalisation  
Germany  has  become  a  plural  society  in  which  living  arrangements  have  become 
diversified. This also  means  that there is no longer a standard biography of  family 
formation. In particular, the formerly typical female biography of school – training – 
starting work – marriage – children – leaving work is no longer considered to be the 
only way of doing things even in the conservative corporatist welfare state of Germany. 
The analyses of the Microcensus have shown that marriage with children is still the 
dominant life model, but that it has lost its unchallenged dominance. The basic model 
of  marriage  with  children  has  been  supplemented  by  a  broader  range  of  living 
arrangements,  including  singles,  non-marital  cohabitation,  lone  parents,  patchwork 
families or living apart together. From a sociological point of  view, this process is 
referred to as de-institutionalisation. This does not mean that no one is marrying any 
more  or  having  children,  but  that  standardisation  of  conduct  along  the  lines  of  the 
institution of marriage/family has become weaker. Classical and if-then links such as, 
“if love, then marriage”; or, “if marriage, then children”, have become loosened. This is 
a social precondition for pluralisation of the living arrangements to take place, and 
hence also for living arrangements to have become commonplace in which far fewer 
children are born.  
 
 
6.7 The economic situation of the family and the high appreciation of children  
In Germany, families experience an economic roller-coaster effect: At the start of the 
time as a parent, the family income is still high (maternity benefits from the health 
insurance fund), but then once the parents start drawing child benefits, which are not 
linked to previous income, it falls considerably. Having children is regarded as one of 
the poverty risks in Germany. One child in ten is now affected by poverty, according to 
investigations that have been carried out by the OECD. This applies especially to child-Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 17 
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rich  families and single parents. In this context, a particular problem arises  for the 
middle classes, in which only small numbers of children are born since the financial 
risk emanating from the birth of children is considered to be particularly threatening. 
This is caused by the fact that, given that the woman as a rule has to leave work, one 
income  is  missing,  which  has  a  negative  effect  on  the  family’s  per  capita  income. 
Parental benefits and child benefits do not make up for this loss. The economic situation 
of  childless  households  is  much  more  favourable  than  that  of  those  who  live  with 
children. This is enhanced by the high appreciation of children. The decision to have 
children is, as a rule, made deliberately. It is stressed here that the children should enjoy 
favourable conditions to get a good start in life. If this cannot be guaranteed because of 
the financial situation, the decision is made not to have children.  
 
 
6.8 The situation in Eastern Germany  
Fertility in Western and Eastern Germany is now, once again, approximately equal. An 
increase appears to be unlikely in Eastern Germany. Eastern Germany is regarded as a 
problem region because of the economic situation, where incomes are lower but the cost 
of  having  a  child  is  the  same.  High  unemployment,  manifest  xenophobia,  and  the 
ongoing loss of sections of the population through emigration and the rapid ageing of 
the population, are only a few of the symptoms of the crisis this region is experiencing. 




6.9 Low desired fertility  
For many years, the gap between desired fertility and the realised number of children 
has  been  large.  More  recently,  desired  fertility  has  fallen,  and  hence  the  difference 
between the number of children and desired fertility has become very slight. To date, 
there are no examples of family policy being able to influence attitudes towards family 
sizes.  It  cannot  be  anticipated  that  the  TFR  could  rise  over  and  above  the  average 
number of desired children. With the fall in desired fertility, a barrier could have been 
formed in Germany which may even prevent fertility from increasing in the long term. 
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7. Consequences  
Germany is a low-fertility country, and will remain so for the foreseeable future. This is 
the conclusion of the discussion on the reasons for low fertility in the above section. 
Four  reasons  are  decisive  for  this.  First,  childlessness  has  become  established  in 
Germany  and  still  shows  an  upward  trend.  A  considerable  degree  of  childlessness 
makes a sizeable increase in fertility virtually impossible. Second, desired fertility is 
low and it does not give rise to the hope that more children might be born in the future. 
Third, a culture of individualism can be found in Germany which forms the basis of 
mass decisions against  family formation.  And  fourth,  family policy is currently not 
conceived in a manner supportive of childbearing. A change in family policy is needed, 
and is indeed starting to take place. This process is just beginning, and will take some 
time.  
The  consequence  of  the  low-fertility  situation  will  be  ever-accelerating 
demographic ageing. Figure 9 shows the change in the age structure of the population 
between 2000 and 2030. In addition to increasing life expectancy, which is not the 
subject of the observation here, population ageing in Germany has two causes related to 
birth trends.  
First, the strong baby boom birth cohorts of the 1960s left behind a demographic 
wave in the age structure. This can already be found in the age structure of the 2000 
population at about age 35. The birth cohorts after 1975, born after the end of Europe’s 
Second  Demographic  Transition,  are  then  quantitatively  much  smaller.  By  2050, 
population ageing will be characterised above all by the baby boom generation. This 
group will enter retirement age from roughly 2020 onwards, and will set off an ever 
accelerating ageing process. The share of the elderly (65+) will hence clearly increase. 
It was 11.5% in 1960, whereas by 2004 an increase to 18.0% had taken place, and by 
2050,  according  to  prognoses  of  the  Federal  Statistical  Office  (10th  coordinated 
population forecast, medium variant), a further increase to 29.6% will occur.  
The impact of population ageing will be tangible in a large number of social areas. 
A very intensive discussion is currently taking place about this in Germany. Here, the 
topics  old-age  pensions,  health  and  long-term  care,  social  cohesion  and  internal 
security,  ageing  and  settlement  structures,  as  well  as  employment  and  the  labour 
market, are repeatedly placed in focus.  
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Figure 9:  Actual and projected age structure of the population in Germany,  
  2000 and 2030 (in %) 
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